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Abstract
I examine the impact of market design on the performance of a
cap-and-trade program for Individual Fishing Quotas. In equilibrium,
neither the term of the quota, the number of years for which it is
valid, nor the method of initial allocation, granting or selling, has
a differential effect on the protability of the shery or the quality of
the environment. However, the term of the quota and the method
of initialization can have a big impact on the price discovery process
and whether equilibrium is attained. Because of this, both the fishery
and the environment can be signicantly better off with a mixture of
historically based grants and auctions with some form of limited term
quotas. I also discuss some additional benefits from an initialization
process that generates some revenue for the public. Section 5 contains
a summary.
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1 Introduction
A Cap-and-Trade program with Individual Fishing Tradable Quotas (IFQs)
is an efficient and cost-effective method for managing a fishery. Once IFQs
are created and allocated, the total catch is controlled through the cap. This
control provides benefits both to fishermen, who care about the economic
viability of the fishery, and to environmentalists, who care about the bio-
logical viability of the fishery. The benefits to the environment come in a
more sustainable fish population. The benefits to the fishermen come in the
increase in profits due to solving their commons problem. In many respects,
the interests of the fishermen and those of the environmentalists are aligned.
There are many choices that must be made when a new IFQ program is
initiated. Two of these fall under the purview of market design: the structure
of the quota, the quota that is created to control the catch, and the method
by which the initial allocation of quotas is made. Both of these choices
potentially affect the economics of the fishery and the sustainability of the
environment. In this paper, I look at limited term quotas as an alternative
to permanent quotas. I also evaluate the differential effects on fishery and
environment of an initial grant of quotas versus an initial sale.
The findings are straight-forward if sometimes counterintuitive. (1) In
equilibrium, neither the term structure of the quotas nor the method of
initial allocation affect the profitability of the fishery or the sustainability of
the environment. All choices of the fishermen (effort, gear choice, entry or
exit, etc.) are the same in all variations. (2) The structure of the quotas
and the method of initial allocation can affect the extent to which market
equilibrium is attained. Some limited term structure on the quotas and
some auctioning will lead to more transparent and liquid trading which in
turn will lead to higher profitability for the fishermen and a higher value for
the environment. This does require some of the potential increase in wealth
to be allocated to the operation of the program, but all will be better off if
that is done. (3) Even if the IFQ program is run in a way that attains its
highest level of performance for both the fishery and the environment, there
remain opportunities for further improvement. If some of the wealth created
by the IFQ program is put towards solving these problems, both the fishery
and the environment can be made better off together.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I present a
model of the fishery that includes both economic and environmental compo-
nents. I analyze the equilibrium impact of two methods of initial allocation:
2
granting and selling. I also analyze the equilibrium impact of limited term
quotas. The material in this section is somewhat technical. The reader who
wants to avoid that can jump straight to Section 2.5 for a non-technical dis-
cussion of the model and results. In Section 3, I look at the price discovery
process - how the market equilibrium of Section 2 might be attained. I look at
the impact of grandfathering, auctioning, and limited terms in this context.
In Section 4, I look at some of the remaining economic and environmental
problems that are not solved by an IFQ program even if it functions at full
efficiency. A summary with conclusions is provided Section 5.
2 Equilibrium Analysis
I begin with a fairly standard model of the fishery.1 I try to capture both
the economic and environmental aspects of the situation.
The fishery The stock of fish in year t is bt. The annual rate of change of
this stock is given by:
bt+1 = bt + f(bt, et)−Qt (1)
where et is the quality of the environment, including the carrying capacity,
and Qt is the total catch that period. f(bt, et)/bt is the natural growth rate
of the population. The exact form of f will be different for different species,
but the market design results in this paper do not change if f changes.
The environment The environment can replenish itself if left alone but
can also be damaged if fishermen use inappropriate technology or participate
in extensive discarding.2 There are I fishermen labeled i = 1, ..., I. Let τ i
be the level of technology used by fisherman i, how they fish, where higher
values of τ i are good for the environment but cost the fisherman more to
1Equations (1) and (3) can be found in early models of the fishery. More recent refer-
ences include [4] and [5]. Equation (2) is one of many ways of getting the externality to the
environment into the model. The results in this paper do not depend on this particular
form.
2By environment I generally mean habitat quality, those things that provide the car-
rying capacity for the biomass in equation (1).
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execute.3 The annual rate of improvement (or decline) in the environment is
given by
et+1 = et + g(et, τ1, ..., τI). (2)
It should be noted that the form of (2) provides a commons problem that
an IFQ program does not directly solve. That is, a fisherman’s choice of the
way they fish affects all of the fishermen in the fishery. Choosing a good
method conveys benefits to all but, in choosing one’s methods of fishing, one
generally considers only the benefits to oneself. Thus fishermen will generally
choose too little of the good method. We will return to this issue in Section
4.
The fishermen The final piece of the model is the profit, pii, of a fisherman
in any one year. I assume that4
pii = pQi − ci(Qi, τ i, bt). (3)
Fishermen may differ in their type of equipment, boat size, capabilities,
marginal value of leisure, outside opportunities, etc. In this model they
are not homogeneous.5
2.1 An IFQ program
A tradable IFQ program is implemented by choosing a maximum limit on
the total catch in each year, called the total available catch (TAC), and then
allocating a percentage of the quota to each fisherman. Let αi be the percent
3It is assumed here that the choice of technology can be made anew in each period
with no switching costs. This is undoubtedly unrealistic, but it only strengthens our
conclusions. If desired, transition costs and irreversible effects could be added at a cost of
complexity.
4I write this in the standard way, assuming perfect competition in the output market
with the competitive price of p. This is not necessary for the conclusions of the paper.
The results would still obtain if p depended on Q, as it would in an non-competitive
marketplace. The results would also still obtain if demand can shift over time. For sake
of simplicity, I leave out all of these complexities.
5If all fishermen are homogeneous, then the problem is really trivial. Allocate the quota
evenly among them. There will be no need for trading. The results to follow still hold
and are significantly easier to obtain.
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of the the TAC that fisherman i is allocated where
∑
i α
i = 1. If the TAC in
year t is At then he can catch a maximum of α
iAt fish in that year.
Accompanying the allocation is a policy to choose the TAC for each year
t, indicated by At. That policy is given by
At = A(bt, et). (4)
Here I am assuming that the TAC is set each year in a way that depends
predictably on the biomass bt and the environmental quality, et. This does
not require that biomass or environmental quality be predictable. The equa-
tion subsumes a lot of processes whose specific forms are not necessary for
this paper. For example, the stock assessment part of determining the TAC
is included in equation (4). It is required that each fisherman’s catch in year
t, Qit, be no greater than their quota for that year which is α
i times the TAC.
For this paper, I will assume that all fishermen always use all of their
quota. That is,6
Qit = α
iA(bt, et). (5)
I assume there is a sufficiently accurate monitoring and strong penalty system
in place to deter over-running one’s quota.
Summary Given a fishery policy, determined by (4) and (5), and a quota
allocation, αi, a fisherman at time t will choose an amount of catch Qit and a
method of fishing τ it . This in turn will determine the next period’s stock of
fish and environmental quality through equations (1) and (2). This process
repeats itself into the future.
2.2 Permanent Quota
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the effect of two market design
alternatives on the choices of fishermen and, thus, on the biomass and en-
vironmental quality. I begin the comparative analysis by considering a base
case on which I can build. I begin with the case in which fishermen have an
allocation of permanent quota.
6The only time this will not be true is if the TAC is not binding on the fleet; that is,
there was no need for a quota. Otherwise, if there is trading, any fisherman with excess
quota will sell it to another.
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The situation is made a bit more complex than the standard model be-
cause of the availabilty of trading at every point in time. At the beginning
of each period t, a fisherman holds an amount of quota αt−1. In period t,
they can buy or sell quota which will determine how large their catch can
be, they must choose their technology, how they fish, and they must do this
taking into account the future. We model this as follows.
Suppose there are going to be a series of spot markets, one for each t,
in which fishermen can buy and sell quota at that time. It is easiest to
see what happens in such a setup by considering a Rational Expectations
Equilibrium.7 In the Rational Expectations Equilibrium model, there is a
price qt, for quota bought or sold in time t. The price qt clears the market
for quota in period t. Finally, at any time t∗, the price at t is correctly
anticipated by all fishermen for all times t ≥ t∗.
At time t, a fisherman owns an amount of quota, αt−1, carried over from
the previous period. She needs to choose, for each t, a level of desired quotas
for t, αt, and a level of technology for t, τt She faces a dynamic programming
problem where the solution is found recursively by solving for all t ≥ 0:8
vt(αt−1, bt, et) = max
α,τ
{pαA(bt, et)− c(αA(bt, et), τ, bt, et)− qt(α− αt−1)
+δvt+1(α, bt+1, et+1)}. (6)
On the left hand side of the equality is the present discounted value to
the fisherman of holding αt−1 when the biomass is bt and the state of the
environment is et. On the right hand side are her revenue in this period
minus her costs in this period minus her financial costs of trading plus the
discounted value of where she ends up at the end of t (which is the beginning
of t + 1). The values of bt+1 and et+1 come from equations (1) and (2). She
has two choices to make in each t: how much to fish, αt, and how to fish, τt.
We can greatly simplify the equations to make it easier to derive some
results. Let
Wt(αt−1, bt, et) =vt(αt−1, bt, et)− qtαt−1. (7)
7There are many ways to model a complete set of markets, including allowing a full
set of futures markets at each time t for both leases and quota. One can also introduce
uncertainty about prices, etc. But these generalizations mostly introduce unnecessary
complexities into the analysis.
8I leave off the index i from expressions when it is clear what is going on to avoid
excessive notation.
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I can then re-write (6) as
Wt(αt−1, bt, et) + qtαt−1 = max
α,τ
{pαA(bt, et)− c(αA(bt, et), τ, bt, et)− qt(α− αt−1)
+δ[Wt+1(α, bt+1, et+1) + qt+1α]}
or in more compact form, subtracting qtαt−1 from each side
Wt(αt−1, bt, et) = max
α,τ
{pαA(bt, et)− c(αA(bt, et), τ, bt, et)− qtα + δqt+1α
+δWt+1(α, bt+1, et+1)}. (8)
It is straight-forward to verify that ∂Wt/∂αt−1 = 0 for all t, so we can write
Wt as Wt(bt, et). We can come to a number of conclusions about the choices
of the fishermen from this.
First, the choice of quota, αt, solves
max
α
{pαA(bt, et)− c(αA(bt, et), τt, bt, et)− (qt − δqt+1)α}. (9)
and is entirely independent of the value of αt−1. That is, in a fully functioning
marketplace, the optimal choice by a fisherman of quotas needed in any
period does not depend on their previous period holdings. Further, in a fully
functioning market, the fisherman’s choice of αt is entirely independent of
the future value to the fisherman. The value Wt+1(bt+1, et+1) does not show
up in equation (9). The only future thing that is important in the choice of
α is the price for quota in t + 1, qt+1. If markets are working correctly then
qt− δqt+1 is just the leasing price for 1 year for 1 unit of quota - the price to
buy 1 unit less the discounted price from selling it in the next period.9
Second, the choice of technology, τt, solves
10
max
τ
{−c(αtA(bt, et), τ, bt, et)
+δWt+1(bt + f(bt, et)−A(bt, et), et + g(et, (τ1, ..., τI/τ))} (10)
9If the leasing price were higher than this, one would be better off buying and re-selling
than leasing. The opposite would be true if the leasing price were smaller than this. This
is the natural result in liquid and transparent markets where all buyers and sellers have
access to frictionless capital markets. That is, they can easily borrow or lend money. This
is undoubtedly not true in reality which creates market frictions. I will address these
frictions later.
10I use the standard notation (τ1, ..., τI/τ) to represent the vector (τ1, ..., τI) with the
ith entry replaced by τ. I am assuming a Nash Equilibrium in τ.
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This choice is also independent of αt−1. It does depend on the future,
through Wt+1(bt+1, et+1). It does not depend directly on the price of quota
although it does depend on the choice of αt which does.
Equations (9) and (10) determine a demand function for αit, independent
of αt−1, where
αit = α
i
t(bt, et, qt − δqt+1). (11)
These demands determine an equilibrium set of prices qˆ1, qˆ2, ..., qˆt, ... where∑
i
αit(bb, et, qˆt − δqˆt+1) = 1, for all t. (12)
If the fishery is in a steady state then bt = b, et = e, τ
i
t = τ
i and qt = q for
all t. So, in particular, if δ = 1/(1 + r) where r is the interest rate, then at
time t the lease price of quota (qˆt − δqˆt+1) = [r/(1 + r)]q.
I have not explicitly let the fisherman contemplate the possibility of exit
from or entry into the fishery. To do so would not change any of the com-
parative results, but would only further complicate the notation. I do show
in the Appendix how to include entry and exit in the model.
2.3 The Effect of the Process of Initial Allocation un-
der Permanent Quota
In this section, I look at the effect of two initial allocation schemes: granting
and selling. An example of a grant is grandfathering which involves a one-
time allocation based on historical performance in the fishery. An example
of a sale is auctioning, a one-time sale of quotas. I do this in the context of
permanent quota with full trading in fully functioning markets.
2.3.1 Grant
Suppose the IFQ program is initiated with a one time grant of permanent
quota to each fisherman. At time 0, each fisherman is given a gift of αi0 of
the quota where
∑
αi0 = 1. For now, it is not particularly important how this
allocation is determined, just that it is free.11 From the preceding analysis,
the value to i of αi0 is found in equation (6), where v
i
1(α
i
0, b1, e1). This can also
11If it is known or anticipated that grandfathering is the way that the initial allocation
of the quota is to be done, then a very bad unintended consequence occurs. Fishermen find
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be written as in equation (7) and following: W i1(b1, e1) + q1α0. In equilibrium
the marginal value of α is simply, q1, the price at which this quota could be
sold in period 1. Alternatively, it is the value to the fisherman of not having
to buy α in period 1. So if the fisherman is granted an amount α0, at t = 1
that gift is worth q1α0 to him. If, on the other hand, he buys α0 at a price
q0, then at t = 1 it is worth (q1 − q0)α0 to him.
In a fully functioning market equilibrium, the present discounted value of
the quota program is the value of the grant. It is entirely capitalized in the
initial price, q1.
2.3.2 Sale
Suppose the IFQ program is initiated with a one time sale of permanent quota
to each fisherman. There are many ways to implement such a sale. Here, I
assume it to be done with a uniform price clock auction.12 Although the pro-
ceeds from the sale can be distributed in many ways through many processes,
including ones which involve participation of the fishermen themselves, I will
assume for now that the proceeds go to the public, to be distributed later.
Invoking the revelation principle from mechanism design, it is easy to
show that, with liquid and transparent markets, the allocation and price
outcome of the sale with a uniform price clock auction will be the same as
that of a demand-supply market.13 If qA is the price per unit quota that
must be paid at the auction at the beginning of period 1, then at that price,
fisherman i will want to buy the amount of quota αˆi(q) that solves (from
(9)):
max
α
{pαA(b1, e1)− c(αA(b1, e1), τ1, b1, e1)− (qA − δq2)α}. (13)
The solution to this problem is exactly the same for every qA as the solution
to (9). How much quota a fisherman starts with has no bearing on how
it now in their interest to to focus their investments and efforts on things that raise their
catch levels so as to, hopefully, increase their share of quota at the time it is allocated.
Over-fishing can be significantly increased in anticipation of the quota and can actually
lead to a lower stock for a long period of time, even after the IFQ program begins. For
the rest of this paper, I will ignore this effect.
12What is crucial here is that it is a one-price equilibrium. For the curious, I describe
the uniform price clock auction in more detail in Appendix III
13See [2] for more on the theoretical and experimental background for this claim of
equivalence.
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much quota he wants to end up with.14 It follows that the auction price will
be exactly the same as the equilibrium price, qˆ, that solved (12). That is,
qA = q1. The price paid in the auction is exactly the same as the price that
would arise in period 1 if the quota were granted and then trade occured.
Further, even if trading were to be opened after the auction, none would
occur since the auction already has allocated the quota to those who value
it the most.
The value to i of the sale is W i1(b1, e1) since α0 = 0.
2.3.3 Comparing Grant and Sale
Because the optimal decisions for the fishermen in each period are indepen-
dent of their quota holdings in previous periods, the comparison between
grants and sales at t = 0 is straight-forward. All choices, those of (αt, τt)
for all t, are the same whether there is an sale or grant. This means that
W i1(b1, e1) is the same in both cases. The only difference is in the distribution
of the present discounted value of the quota program capitalized in the price,
q1. Under the grant, the fishermen get q1, the public gets 0. . Under the
sale, the public gets q1, the fishermen get 0.
15 The value at time 1 to our
fisherman of the quota, α0, is v1(α0, b1, e1) = W1(b1, e1) + q1α0. He is better
off with the gift by an amount q0α0. We can summarize this in
Theorem 1 With permanent quota and fully functioning markets, in equi-
librium, the path over time of Qt, bt, and et will be exactly the same under a
regime in which quota is granted as under a regime in which quota is sold.
Quota prices will also be the same under either regime. Under the grant the
fishermen capture the full value, q1, of the quota program. Under the sale the
public captures the full value, q1 of the quota program.
As before, efficiency and environmental impact are the same under grant
and sale. Only the distribution of wealth differs.
14In a well-functioning market without frictions, the opportunity cost of using his hold-
ings is exactly the same as his cost of buying quota in the market place.
15Actually, the fishermen also get something else under both grant and sale - W1(b1, e1).
This will be higher than what they would have had without a quota program. So the
fishermen receive some benefit from the program, under any initial allocation process.
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2.4 Quota with Limited Terms
It is not necessary to make an all or nothing decision with respect to the initial
allocation of the quota. One does not need to choose between granting all of
the quota in period 1 or selling all of the quota in period 1. There are policies
that avoid either the outright gift of all value to the incumbents, through a
grant of permanent quota, or the outright grant of all value to the public,
through the sale of permanent quota. One such approach is to grant quota
with a limited term. Under this policy one allocates quota originally, as in
a grant, but makes the original quota good only for T years. At the end of
the Tth year, those quotas are no longer valid and new ones, which are now
permanent, are then sold.
In this section, I look at the impact of a policy of limited term quota and
how this compares with a grant or sale of permanent quota at time 0. I work
backwards for three periods because the answer reveals itself at that point.
Grant of Permanent Quota Remember how the problem looks at time
T-1, T, and T+1 to someone who received permanent quota in period 0. At
the beginning of year T+1, a fisherman’s value is (I use the superscript G to
denote that this is the grant solution):
WGT+1(bT+1, eT+1) + q
G
T+1αT (14)
Moving back to T, we know that
WGT (bT , eT ) + q
G
T αT−1 = max
α,τ
{pαA(bT , eT )− c(αA(bT , eT ), τ, bT , eT )
−qGT (α− αT−1) + δ[WGT+1(bT+1, eT+1) + qGT+1α]}. (15)
Finally, for T-1, we know that
WGT−1(bT−1, eT−1) + q
G
T−1αT−2 = max
α,τ
{pαA(bT−1, eT−1)
−c(αA(bT−1, eT−1), τ, bT−1, eT−1)− qGT−1(α− αT−2)
+δ[WGT (bT , eT ) + q
G
T α]}. (16)
Grant of Limited Term quota followed by Sale of Permanent Quota
Now let’s consider someone who receives the same amount of quota in period
0 but where that quota expires at the end of period T. To continue fishing
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after T , they will have to buy newly available permanent quota from the sale
between T and T + 1.
At time T + 1 the difference between the fisherman who receives a per-
manent quota at time 0 and the fisherman whose quota lasts only T years is
minimal. For the fisherman with the limited term quota, their value at T is
(using the superscript L to denote the limited term solution):
WLT+1(bT+1, eT+1) = W
G
T+1(bT+1, eT+1) (17)
Compare this to (14) for the person with permanent quota. Looking forward,
the value to both is the same. The only difference at T + 1 is that the fixed
term quota holder loses the value of αT .
But this loss carries back to T. In period T, the value of the limited term
quota holder is:
WLT (bT , eT ) + q
L
TαT−1 = max
α,τ
{pαA(bT , eT )− c(αA(bT , eT ), τ, bT , eT )
−qLT (α− αT−1) + δWLT+1(bT+1, eT+1)} (18)
Because the scenarios are different and, thus, the equilibrium prices could be
different, we use qL. Suppose qLT = q
G
T − δqGT+1. Then I can re-write (18) as
WLT (bT , eT ) + q
G
T αT−1 = max
α,τ
{pαA(bT , eT )− c(α,A(bT , eT ), τ, bT , eT )
−qGT (α− αT−1) + δ[WGT+1(bT+1, eT+1) + qGT+1α]} (19)
Comparing this to (15) we can see that the optimal choices for αT and τT
are exactly the same in G and L. It follows that WLT (b, e) = W
G
T (b, e).
To see that this is not all an accident, let us move back one more period
to T − 1 where the value for the limited term is:
WLT−1(bT−1, eT−1) + q
L
T−1αT−2 = max
α,τ
{pαA(bT−1, eT−1)
−c(α,A(bT−1, eT−1), τ, bT−1, eT−1)− qLT−1(α− αT−2)
+δ[WLT (bT , eT ) + q
L
Tα]} (20)
Because WLT (b, e) = W
G
T (b, e), if I let q
L
T−1 = q
G
T−1 − δ2qGT+1, then I can
rewrite (20) as
WLT−1(bT−1, eT−1) + q
G
T−1αT−2 = max
αT−1,τ
{pαA(bT−1, eT−1)
−c(αA(bT−1, eT−1), τ, bT−1, eT−1)− qGT−1(α− αT−2)
+δ[WGT (bT , eT ) + q
G
T α]} (21)
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Again it is true that for these prices, that the optimal choices for αT−1 and
τT−1 are the same in both G and L and WLT−1(b, e) = W
G
T−1(b, e).
I can continue this back to t = 0. In the end what we learn is
Theorem 2 Let qGt be the equilibrium prices and α
G
t , τ
G
t be the equilibrium
choices when permanent quotas are granted at t = 0. Define the prices qLt =
qGt for all t > T and q
L
t = q
G
t − δT+1−tqGT+1 for all t ≤ T . Then the prices qLt
are equilibrium prices for the limited term quota policy. Further, let αLt = α
G
t
and τLt = τ
G
t . Then α
L
t and τ
L
t are equilibrium choices for the limited term
quota policy.
Behavior is exactly the same under a grant of permanent quota or a grant of
limited term quota followed by an auction. It relatively easy to understand
intuitively what is happening. All holders of the quotas at T suffer a loss of
qT+1α
i
T when their quota expires. In equilibrium, the price of the quota αt
is adjusted in each period t up to T for the present discounted value of this
coming capital loss. The present discounted value at time t of this per-unit
loss in period T +1 is δT+1−tqT+1. The loss is capitalized into the price of the
quota.
The effect of the limited term policy is simply a lump-sum transfer out of
the system at time T. But it also shares the benefits of the quota program.
The fishermen get q1 − δT+1−tqT+1. The public gets δT+1−tqT+1.
Sale of Permanent Quota at T = 0 To finish this section, let us compare
the grant of limited term quota with the sale of permanent quota at T = 0.
Remember that, from Section 2.3.3, the difference between the grant and the
sale of permanent quota at T = 0, is that under the grant the fishermen get
q1 more and the public gets q1 less than under the sale. Now consider the
grant of quota with life T followed by the sale of permanent quota. From
the previous section, the value at t = 0 to the fishermen of the difference
between this and a grant of permanent quota is δT+1qT+1.
If T = 0, then, the value of the difference at t = 1 is δq1, exactly the
same as the sale of permanent quota at 0. The difference to the fishermen
between a sale at 0 and a sale at T is q1 − δT+1qT+1. If the fishery were
in a steady-state situation, then qt = q
∗ for all t and the difference to the
fishermen is (1− δT+1), the amount they gain by postponing the transfer of
wealth from period 0 to period T.
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A Mixed Bag One can accommodate into our analysis any number of
term lengths and any variety of grant and sale. For example, suppose one
wants to allocate 78% of the quota through grandfathering with 22% to be
allocated by auctions over the next 10 years. The management could reserve
2% for an initial auction. the rest, 20%, would be allocated to the fishermen.
Each fisherman would be given a portfolio of quotas that consists of 10% of
1 year quotas, 10% of 2 year quotas, and so on up to 10 year quotas. This
would mean that the management would have 2% of the original quota to sell
at auction for each of the next 10 years. When sold at auction, the quotas
would be permanent. As before, nothing changes in the equilibrium choices
of the amount of fishing, αt or the style of fishing, τt. The market prices of
quota will be different to reflect the flow out of the system of the proceeds
from each of the 10 auctions.16 If the prices of quota would be qEt under
a grant of permanent quota, then we can determine the price of quota at t
with a remaining life of L as qEt − δL+1qEt+L+1. The present discounted value
of the auction proceeds will be S = (.02)[q1 + δq2 + ...+ δ
10q11]. So the public
gets S and the fishermen get q1 − S.
Adaptive Management A proposal exists in the West Coast Fisheries
to hold back 10% of the quota to be used to solve various social and en-
vironmental side effects of the fishery. One idea is that each year, 10% of
the quota for that year, would be sold to generate a flow of income for the
program. In a fully functioning marketplace, the sale of 10% of quota in year
t is equivalent to leasing the quota for 1 year. The leasing price is qt− δqt+1.
Thus, the sale will yield It = .1(qt − δqt+1). The present discounted value
of this is .1(δt−1It) = .1(δt−1qt − δtqt+1). Adding these up over time gives
us the present discounted value of the leases which is
∑∞
t=0 It = .1q1., the
discounted value of the 10% of the grant of quota for adaptive management.
The fishermen get .9q1 and the public gets .1q1.
2.5 Summary
In this section, I have provided a fairly standard equilibrium model of the
fishery that includes its effect on the environment. In the model, fishermen
are heterogeneous with possibly different costs of fishing, labor-leisure pref-
16There will also be more markets since the price of quota with 2 years left will be
different from the price of quota with 3 years left.
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erences, size of boat, etc. They choose the level at which they fish: the size
of the catch. They also choose how they fish, the technology they use: gear
choice, location, high-grading, etc. A simple cap-and-trade IFQ program is
included in the model. If there are well-functioning, transparent and liquid
markets for the quota quotas, then a Rational Expectations Equilibrium will
occur. So I look at what happens in this equilibrium.17 In the context of this
model, I analyze two fundamental features of the market design for an IFQ
program: the initialization process and the term of the quotas. I evaluate
three policies of initialization and term: the grant of permanent quota, the
sale of permanent quota, and the grant of limited term quota followed by a
sale of permanent quota. The results are very easy to state. In equilibrium,
the behavior of the fishermen, with respect to both the level of fishing and
the method of fishing is no different under any of the three policies. There-
fore, the effect of the policies on the fishery and the environment is identical.
Only the distribution of wealth is different.
These conclusions are also true for any combination of limited term quota,
sales, or grants. That means that it is possible to fix the amount and tim-
ing of any split between the fishermen and the auctioneer by choosing the
appropriate initialization policy. I give one example above under ”a mixed
bag”.
3 Getting to Equilibrium
An IFQ program that hands out quotas and does nothing further leaves a
lot of important problems unsolved. One of these is incomplete trading. If
a cap-and-trade IFQ program is to attain its full potential for profitability
and environmental health, the cap is not enough. There must be trade. All
the possible gains from trade must be found and captured.18 Indeed, market
equilibrium will not be found without this; in equilibrium, there are no more
gains from trade. But equilibrium does not happen magically. Getting there
requires a well-functioning, transparent, and liquid market place.
17In the next section, I take up what happens if markets have significant frictions and
are neither transparent nor liquid.
18There are gains from trade if at least two people can gain from reallocating quota
between them. That is, if A can make more profit with the quota than B, then the quota
can be transferred to A and A can compensate B in a way that makes them both better
off. Such a trade is voluntary and improves the welfare of both.
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In this section, I explore the impact of the quota structure and the ini-
tialization policies on the process of getting to equilibrium, a process often
referred to as price discovery. We will see that in disequilibrium, as opposed
to equilibrium, market design does matter.19
Grants and laissez faire Consider an initialization policy in which a
permanent quota is granted based on historical performance with trade pre-
sumed to follow. For now, let us assume that nothing else is done as part of
the IFQ program. In particular, there are no organized markets or brokers. I
refer to this situation as ”laissez faire” since traders are on their own to find
counter parties willing to trade with them. Will the level of trade necessary
for efficient utilization of the fishery, higher profits, and better environmental
health naturally occur? Unfortunately the answer seems to be that it is not
likely. Let us examine why.
With the traders on their own, this is a market place that is fraught
with frictions. The only way a trade can occur is if two fishermen put in
the effort to search, find each other, and negotiate a trade. Search costs
interfere with the finding process and asymmetric information interferes with
the negotiation process. Together, these frictions will prevent fishermen from
taking advantage of much of the potential gains from trade.20 Each individual
knows only about their own little piece of the marketplace. They know
nothing of other negotiations and other trades. There is little transparency.
Consequently there will be only sporadic trades. There is little liquidity.
Forget for a moment the process of finding one another. Consider the
negotiation process where there is bilateral asymmetric information. Neither
fisherman knows for sure the price at which the other is willing to buy or sell
and each would like to make the best possible deal. It has been well under-
stood since 1983.21 that the incentives created by asymmetric information
lead bidders to shade their bids when involved in bilateral negotiations. Even
if there are gains to be had, there is a significant probability that trade will
not occur. So, even if all possible pairs of fishermen meet and negotiate, an
19Because the state of economic modeling of price discovery is significantly poorer than
of equilibrium, I will rely on intuitive arguments in this section. Much of what I will say
can be supported with economic theory and experiments. We are working on those now.
20These frictions are sometimes called transactions costs and are well recognized for
inhibiting trade in other cap-and-trade programs, such as those for air pollution control.
See [6].
21See [3] for a full explication of this theoretical result.
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unlikely occurrence, many of those gains from trade will still be foregone. But
that fact, in turn, reduces the intensity with which they will search. Since
the expected gains from search are reduced by the negotiation frictions, the
return to searching is reduced. Lower returns means fewer will search.
An initialization policy of granting with a laissez faire approach to trading
is not enough. Asymmetric information and search costs impose significant
frictions and prevent traders from finding and sharing the gains from trade.
The market place lacks transparency and liquidity. Incomplete trading is
the result. The potential profits achievable with complete trading will not
materialize.
3.1 Can brokers help?
The naturally occurring response to search and negotiation frictions is bro-
kers. Indeed, some argue that brokers are the complete solution to the in-
efficiency of bilateral trading. The argument is that the broker is a central
clearing house for information about all possible trades: who the buyers and
sellers are and the prices at which they are willing to transact. With that in-
formation, the broker can facilitate all trades and ensure complete processing
of all gains from trade.
But there are at least two problems with this argument. First, brokers
cannot by themselves mitigate the asymmetric information problems. Just
as a seller knows that she can gain by not revealing the true price at which
she is willing to sell to a buyer, she can gain by not revealing the true price
at which she is willing to sell to a broker. The reason is not complicated
and is a variation of the revelation principle. Basically, it is in the interest
of the broker to complete trades. If the seller were to tell the broker her
true willingness to sell and a buyer were to, instead, tell the broker a lower
willingness to buy than is truly the case, then even if the broker treated
them fairly and priced the transaction halfway between the two offers, the
seller would lose out since the price would be closer to her true willingness
to accept than to the buyer’s true willingness to pay. The seller avoids this
by increasing her report to the broker. Second, brokers are not altruists:
they do this for the income and they get income by charging commissions on
trades. Those commissions further lead to incomplete trading for the same
reason any transactions costs do. Brokers may reduce search costs but they
impose costs of their own.
Although brokers won’t solve the asymmetric information problems, they
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could provide information about who is proposing a trade and at what prices
trades are occurring. But, a single broker would not reveal this information,
unless required to by the individuals managing the IFQ system. If there are
multiple brokers, or easy entry into the broker business, competitive pressures
will force the information out. But most cap-and-trade programs do not have
the volume of trading required to support many brokers. For example, in the
RECLAIM program market of Los Angeles for pollution control, there is a
single broker handling most trades. Price information is secret, as are the
size and composition of most trades. Thus transparency is not realized. It is
not in the nature of naturally occurring brokers to create transparency.
Relying on naturally occurring brokers is not enough. Although search
costs are reduced, asymmetric information and broker’s fees continue to im-
pose significant frictions and prevent traders from finding and sharing the
gains from trade. The market place still lacks transparency and liquidity.
Incomplete trading is the result. The potential profits achievable with com-
plete trading will not materialize.
3.2 Improving transparency
It is possible to improve transparency for traders of IFQs. But it does require
proactive work on the part of the management of the IFQ program. A simple
improvement over laissez faire would be to require publication in an easily
accessible place of the prices and fees involved in all trades. But that is not
enough. That only provides information about past trades. Traders also
need information about possible future trades. An alternative that provides
such information is a central market site, such as a web-based marketplace.
With modern information technology, it is really easy and fairly inexpensive
to set up and manage such a market. It is also possible to do this in a way
that is simple for people to understand and use. At such a website, fishermen
could easily see current bids and offers as well as historical information on
prices and quantities of previous trades. They could also easily make bids or
offers and complete profitable trades.22
Creating transparency is desirable, easy, and inexpensive. But is it enough?
If there is sufficient liquidity, then the answer is yes. Liquidity mitigates the
asymmetric information problem through competition. Holding out for a
22A by-product of such a market is that, through the clearance and settlement process,
a very current and precise database of ownership of all quota can be easily maintained.
More on this later.
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better trade is less likely to work if others can jump in and replace you.
Therefore, a trader’s bid will be closer to his true willingness to trade.23
Unfortunately in most cap-and-trade programs, liquidity is very low. In
cap-and-trade markets there are relatively few external events which can
cause a significant shift in the value to the quota, the tradable quota. Thus,
as opposed to equity markets, a trader, who constantly monitors the quota
marketplace in search of capital gains from price movements can anticipate
only low returns. Since the costs of paying constant attention are very high,
traders will only occasionally and intermittently check the market for in-
formation on market history and for possible trades. This aggravates the
liquidity problem. In such a situation, individuals who do want to buy or
sell will only post their bids or offers for a short time.24 Bids and offers
will not be posted often, and when they are posted they will not be viewed
often. It will require a lot of luck for a buyer who is only posting a bid for a
short time to meet a seller who is only occasionally monitoring the market.
And, even if they happen to meet online, it is highly likely they will be the
only buyer and seller at that time which means that the bilateral asymmetric
information problem is back again.
Creating transparency by providing a web based marketplace is not enough.
Asymmetric information and costs of attention will lead to low liquidity.
Without both transparency and liquidity, trading will be incomplete. The
promise of the cap-and-trade IFQ program will not be achieved.
3.3 Improving liquidity
It is possible to improve liquidity for traders of IFQs. But it does require
proactive work on the part of the management of the IFQ program. The
key to getting sufficient liquidity is to recognize that the market need not be
completely liquid all the time. In a cap-and-trade marketplace, where events
that cause significant value changes rarely happen, to accomplish the price
discovery necessary for the attainment of equilibrium and to capture all of
23The theoretical basis for this can be found in [1]. There is also ample experimental
evidence that it doesn’t take many participants to eliminate the adverse selection problem.
Sometimes just two or three on each side is enough.
24If I do not constantly monitor my offer, I risk the possibility that I may lose potential
capital gains. Something might cause the quota value to increase by a lot and, if someone
else knows that before I do, they might accept my offer before I had a chance to raise it.
They will resell and achieve the capital gains that I missed through my inattention.
19
the gains from trade, it is sufficient to ensure that liquidity is high for only
a small number of brief times each year. But, during those times, traders
must be serious and something must happen. If not, then in the future these
liquidity moments will just disappear.
The best way to guarantee active liquidity moments is with auctions that
require the attention of all incumbents in the IFQ program. Well-designed
auctions provide very efficient price discovery. And they are very transpar-
ent. An excellent example of an auction that would improve liquidity in a
cap-and-trade program is the uniform price, clock auction.25 Such auctions
can be two-sided with both buyers and sellers bidding. If everyone actively
participates in such an auction, good things happen. At the end of the auc-
tion, those buyers who value the IFQs the most will have received them.
Those sellers with the lowest value for the IFQs will have sold them. And
since this is a uniform price auction, every transaction is at the same price.
This means there is no need for further trading after the auction stops. The
auction exhausts all gains from trade and the efficient allocation is found.
The price discovery process has found the equilibrium price and allocation.
One of the assumptions above was that everyone actively participates.
How can we guarantee participation by all incumbents? It is not enough to
just announce an auction. Participation occurs only if one feels that they have
something at stake. There may be those who, correctly or not, assume they
have little to gain from participation and so they don’t even pay attention.
For example, if buyers think few sellers will participate then the buyers may
not bother. This has the force of a self-fulfilling prophecy. If buyers don’t
show then seller won’t. How do we avoid this? If the auctioneer has quota
that will be put up for sale at any price then buyers will show. That in turn
will lead sellers to show.
How does the auctioneer get the quota to sell? Through the initialization
policy. As I summarized in section 2.5, it is possible to implement any
combination of grant and auction without affecting, in equilibrium, either
the profitability of the fishery or the health of the environment. So it is
certainly possible to design an initialization policy that provides some quota
at points in time when liquidity events are desired.
An initialization policy which combines granting some portion of the
quota directly to the fishermen and selling the rest in strategically timed
auctions is enough. Grants provide some guarantee that incumbent fish-
25I describe the design of this auction in some detail in Appendix III.
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ermen will not be seriously hurt with the introduction of a cap-and-trade
IFQ program. Auctions will provide the means to create the liquidity and
transparency so vital to the full realization of the potential of the program.
There may be resistance to this since, according to the analysis in Section
2, it involves a transfer of wealth from the fishermen to the public. But the
increase in profit that will occur because of the increase in transparency and
liquidity should more than pay for the initial loss of quota. The net effect is
that all fishermen will be better off.
A regular series of uniform price clock auctions with the required par-
ticipation of all owners of quotas will improve the liquidity. This leads to
complete trading with all gains from trade realized. The quota to be auc-
tioned can be planned with a complete initialization policy. Since the gains
from these trades are sufficient to fund the auctions and still leave incum-
bents protected, all can be better off with this policy. The promise of the
cap-and-trade IFQ program can be achieved.
3.4 Summary
To fully attain the promise of an IFQ cap-and-trade program, trading must
occur in a way that exhausts all potential gains from trade. This requires
a transparent and liquid marketplace. Under a policy in which a grant of
permanent quota is made and nothing further is done, there will be significant
search and negotiation frictions. The naturally occurring market place will
be neither naturally transparent nor liquid.
The management of the IFQ program must be more proactive. Policies
which require public posting of all trading information can increase trans-
parency somewhat but only with lags so that the information is not as rel-
evant as it should be. The operation of a simple web based market can
significantly improve the transparency and relevance of information in the
marketplace. But that market will still be illiquid.
With a web based market place and regularly scheduled uniform price
clock auctions with full articulation, an IFQ cap-and-trade program can
achieve a high level of fishery profits and environmental health.
3.5 An Application: Overfished Species
One place where the issue of getting to equilibrium is particularly crucial
is in new IFQ programs in species that are seriously overfished. Here the
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initial TAC is going to be very small. It is highly unlikely that allocating on
the basis of historical catch will leave anyone with sufficient quota to make
fishing profitable.26 A lot of buying and selling will be necessary to have the
quota used in the most efficient manner. If there are only brokers without
the transparency or liquidity of markets, gross misallocations will result.
This is a situation that calls for a program of mixed grants and auctions.
Some grants based on historical catch can provide some support for the
incumbent fishermen, even if they sell their quota and exit. Auctions can
provide a clear and transparent signal as to the clearing price for quota.
Initial auctions can also be designed so that those fishermen with granted
quota who want to sell can participate and be sure that they will receive a fair
price. Fishermen who want to buy quota will also be able to do so in a way
that does not take advantage of them. The auction provides a level playing
field and a transparent and liquid method for getting the limited quota into
the hands of those that can best use it. All others profit somewhat by that
sales.
4 Other Opportunities
If the IFQ program decides, as it should, to implement an initialization pro-
gram that provides for regularly scheduled auctions, then there is a question
as to what to do with the revenue from such auctions. It could be given to
the incumbents but that would ignore a number of opportunities where its
use could either further increase the efficiency of the fishery or the fairness
of the final benefits created by the IFQ program. In this section, I provide
some examples of those opportunities.
4.1 Other Commons Problems
An IFQ program solves the commons problem of over-fishing of target pop-
ulations. The reduction in the number of fish caught leads to increases in
biomass overtime which leads to a reduction in the costs of fishing. The total
net present discounted value of profits in this fishery go up. This increase
is shared by all fishermen in this fishery. But the benefit to any one fish-
erman is less than the costs to that fisherman if he were to unilaterally cut
back. Thus, it is only through the collective action implementation of an IFQ
26It will also be very contentious since there is so little to go around.
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program that the net gains can be realized. But over-fishing is not the only
commons problem of the fishery. There are other dimensions where collective
action can improve both the profitability of the fishery and the health of the
environment. In this section I look briefly at a few of these.
Management and Operation To achieve a significant increase in prof-
itability for a fishery by the implementation of an IFQ system requires two
things: good management and good markets. Without either of these, the
potential gains will be seriously dissipated. Neither is naturally provided.
The reason is obvious - there is a free rider problem. I would rather have
others pay for this than me, since I will get the benefit anyway. The imple-
mentation of an IFQ program is a recognition that sometimes group agree-
ment on a quota can make everyone better off. Funding and supporting good
management and markets is another examples where this can happen
We have seen that to get good markets one needs an active web based
marketplace and regularly scheduled auctions of existing quota. This requires
funds. It is also important to have good management. Some organization
must be in place to monitor and measure each fisherman’s catch. Then
that catch must be compared to the IFQs owned by that fisherman to assess
compliance. To do that, ownership of the IFQs must be tracked and recorded,
much as is done with title to real property.
Good management also requires cash to pay for the needed personnel
and processes. With good management and markets, profits will be high.
Without good management, all of the profits and biological gains of an IFQ
program will eventually be eroded away by the same forces that required
the creation of the program in the first place. It is not unreasonable to take
some of the gains to create the gain. The higher profitability from good
management and good markets can be self-supporting and leave fishermen
and the environment better off than under a grant of permanent quota and
a laissez faire marketplace.
By-catch There are also problems that affect fishermen outside a partic-
ular fishery, particularly by-catch. Some reduction in unintended by-catch
may occur with the reduction in effort that occurs with IFQs. In many
current U.S. fisheries, a target fishery can be shut down when the by-catch
becomes excessive, the by-catch of one fisherman now affects all. This is
another commons problem that can be addressed by the use of market meth-
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ods. The standard command and control approach is to allocate portions
of a total allowable bycatch amount and/or put in place more monitoring
and enforcement penalties. Some of the revenue from the auctions could cer-
tainly justifiably be used to support monitoring or enforcement. But there
is a better way.
A more incentive compatible approach would expand the IFQ program
to multiple species. Those who trawl species beyond their permitted types
or levels would then have to buy IFQs of the type they caught. The mar-
ket approaches using the cap and trade auctions and fixed term methods as
described in this paper can be applied directly and similarly to the manage-
ment of by-catch. This provides both a natural form of compensation to the
fishermen of the by-catch species as well as an incentive to find and adopt
avoidance methods against further by-catch. In this process a separate or in-
tegrated market is created as well as spot trading with similar characteristics
of transparency and liquidity as described.
4.2 Transitional Fairness
With the introduction of an IFQ program, the increase in economic efficiency
from reducing the commons incentives means that, in the aggregate, the
system is better off. Total profits will be higher. But, there will be winners
and losers. The increase in efficiency means that winners should be able to
compensate the losers. After the compensation everyone is better off than
without the IFQ program. One justification for an initialization program
which grants a significant amount of the quota on an historical basis is the
protection of the incumbents who lose in the reorganization that follow the
beginning of the IFQ program. The argument is simple. The grandfathering
of quota in proportion to past fishing history means that each fisherman’s
allocation is roughly about what their quota would be under a command-and-
control system with no IFQs and no trading. Therefore, all incumbents can
continue fishing at that level and be no worse off than they would be under
command-and-control. But they can do much better by trading and, since
trading is voluntary, anyone who trades will be better off including those
that leave the industry. They were potential losers under the IFQ program
but they are compensated with their grant of initial quota.
But usually the mechanism for providing the compensation to anyone who
is not an incumbent fisherman is not included as part of an IFQ program.
Those who are uncompensated losers often includes the communities and
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businesses that have supported the inefficiently high level of fishing activity
in the past. With the IFQ program their income will drop. It is not unrea-
sonable to allocate some of the funds from the regularly scheduled auctions
to help compensate those hurt by the increase in efficiency.
There can also be those who, while they are ultimately winners, face
temporary transitional difficulties as the fishery and others who rely on it
shift to different, and usually lower, levels of economic activity. Some use of
auction revenues could help make the distribution of final winners more fair.
5 Summary
I have considered several aspects of market design for fishery IFQ programs.
In particular I have looked at the implications for fishery profitability and
environmental health of alternative initialization policies and of the term of
the quotas.
In Section 2, I focus on market equilibrium. I have provided a fairly
standard equilibrium model of the fishery that includes its effect on the envi-
ronment. In the model, fishermen are heterogeneous with possibly different
costs of fishing, labor-leisure preferences, size of boat, etc. They choose the
level at which they fish: the size of the catch. They also choose the technology
they use: gear choice, location, high-grading, etc. A simple cap-and-trade
IFQ program is included in the model. If there are well-functioning, trans-
parent and liquid markets for the quota quotas, then a rational expectations
equilibrium will occur. So I look at what happens in this equilibrium. I eval-
uate three policies of initialization and term: the grant of permanent quota,
the sale of permanent quota, and the grant of limited term quota followed by
a sale of permanent quota. The results are very easy to state. In equilibrium,
the behavior of the fishermen, with respect to both the level of fishing and
the method of fishing is no different under any of the three policies. There-
fore, the effect of the policies on the fishery and the environment is identical.
Only the distribution is different.
These conclusions are also true for any combination of limited term quota,
sales, or grants. That means that it is possible to fix the amount and tim-
ing of any split between the fishermen and the auctioneer by choosing the
appropriate initialization policy.
In section 3, I look at price discovery, the process of finding equilibrium.
To fully attain the promise of an IFQ cap-and-trade program, trading must
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occur in a way that exhausts all potential gains from trade. This requires
a transparent and liquid marketplace. Under a policy in which a grant of
permanent quota is made and nothing further is done, there will be significant
search and negotiation frictions. The naturally occurring market place will
be neither naturally transparent nor liquid. The management of the IFQ
program must be more proactive. Policies which require public posting of all
trading information can increase transparency somewhat but only with lags
so that the information is not as relevant as it should be. The operation of
a simple web based market can significantly improve the transparency and
relevance of information in the marketplace. But that market will still be
illiquid.
Regularly scheduled uniform price clock auctions with the required par-
ticipation of all owners of quotas will improve the liquidity. They lead to
complete trading with all gains from trade realized. The quota to be auc-
tioned can be planned with a complete initialization policy without affecting
the equilibrium fishing or environmental choices. Since the gains from these
trades are sufficient to fund the auctions and still leave incumbents protected,
all can be better off with this policy. The promise of the cap-and-trade IFQ
program can be achieved.
The revenue generated by regularly scheduled auctions provides an op-
portunity to solve other commons and fairness problems in the fishery. In
Section 4, I discuss these very briefly. The commons problems are man-
agement, gear switching, high-grading, and by-catch. The fairness problems
are compensation for losers outside of the fishery incumbents and for those
bearing unusual transition costs.
6 Recommendation
Full realization of all the potential benefits from an IFQ program require
both the cap and the trade. The cap comes with the IFQ program. The
trade depends on market design. My recommendations are to develop an
initialization policy which is a mixture of grandfathering and auctions. The
revenue from the auctions can be used for a number of programs that would
be of benefit to all in the fishery: good management with strong enforcement,
accurate record keeping, well run auctions, good markets with a web based
marketplace, subsidies for gear switching, and minimizing high-grading, and
a strong by-catch program.
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Appendix I: Other Initialization Policies
It is not necessary to choose between granting all quota with permanent
terms, selling all quota with permanent terms, or granting all quota for a
limited term and then selling it at the expiration of the term. It is possible
to mix granting and selling in any proportion desired. It is also possible to
mix terms. Examples of alternatives to either fully grandfathering or fully
auctioning are easy to find.
Overlapping term quotas Issue quotas of 10 years in length with differ-
ing start dates. In year 1 there would be 10 tranches of quotas. One tranche
would have a life of 1 year, one would have a life of 2 years, etc. Each incum-
bent would get their grandfathered share of each of these tranches. When
each tranche expired it would revert to the Management who would then
auction it off. This would generate a cash flow of approximately 10% of the
total available in each of the first 10 years.
Annual auctions Grant all of the quotas initially. Each year, 5% percent
of each person’s holdings as of December 31 would revert to the management
to be auctioned off in, say, January.27 One has to be careful with this type of
scheme since it would be easy for enough to be transferred from fishermen to
management so that the value to the fishermen of the quota at time 0 could
be negative. If x% is taken each year then the value in year 0 of the amount
taken in year t is xδt+1qt+1. So the present discounted value of taking x%
each year is x
∑∞
t=1 δ
tqt. In steady state, this is xq/(1− δ). So if x > (1− δ)
then the value of the quota at time 0 to the fishermen will be negative.28 If
this were the case, they would certainly be loathe to participate.
There are many variations of these schemes. Which is preferred depends
on the desired timing and amounts of the cash flow between the initial holders
of the quotas and the Management.
27One could also do 2.5% on each of June 30 and December 31.
28Usually the relationship between the discount rate δ and the interest rate r is δ =
1/(1 + r), so (1− δ = r/(1 + r). If the interest rate is 5% then x would have to be less than
about 4.75% in order for this program to leave the fishermen with a positive valuation of
quota at time 0.
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Appendix II: Entry and Exit
Adding in the possibility for a fisherman to enter or exit does not change any
of the conclusions on differential impact in this paper. To see that remember
equation (6).
vt(αt−1, bt, et) = max
α,τ
{pαA(bt, et)− c(αA(bt, et), τ, bt, et)
− qt(α− αt−1) + δvt+1(α, bt+1, et+1)}.
Suppose that the fisherman can choose once to exit, sell his boat and
equipment, and sell any quota he may have. When would he do that and
how would that affect the decisions? We rewrite (6) to
vt(αt−1, bt, et) = max{Kt + qtαt−1,max
α,τ
{pαA(bt, et)− c(αA(bt, et), τ, bt, et)
− qt(α− αt−1) + δvt+1(α, bt+1, et+1)}} (22)
where K is the market value of his boat and equipment at this time. This
leads to the equivalent of equation (8)
Wt(bt, et) = max{K,max
α,τ
{pαA(bt, et)− c(αA(bt, et), τ, bt, et)− qtα + δqt+1α
+δWt+1(α, bt+1, et+1)}}. (23)
The fisherman exits if K > maxα,τ{pαA(bt, et)− c(αA(bt, et), τ, bt, et)− qtα+
δqt+1α+ δWt+1(α, bt+1, et+1)}. This exit decision is independent of the hold-
ings αit−1. As before, the decisions as to quota and technology are also inde-
pendent of the holdings of quota from the previous period.
Suppose that the fisherman can decide each period whether to exit or
enter. Then we need to consider two situations - when she is in and when
she is out. When she is in the value calculation looks just like the above
except for the continuation value. It is
vt(in, αt−1, bt, et) = max{Kt + qtαt−1 + δvt+q(out, αt, bt+1, et+q),max
α,τ
{pαA(bt, et)
−c(αA(bt, et), τ, bt, et)− qt(α− αt−1) + δvt+1(in, α, bt+1, et+1)}}.
(24)
When she is out it is
vt(out, αt−1, bt, et) = max{qtαt−1 + δvt+q(out, αt, bt+1, et+q),max
α,τ
{pαA(bt, et)
−c(αA(bt, et), τ, bt, et)− qt(α− αt−1) + δvt+1(in, α, bt+1, et+1)} −Kt}.
(25)
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It is true that vt(out, αt−1, bt, et) = vt(in, αt−1, bt, et)−Kt. It is also true, as
before, that the entry and exit decisions as well as the fishing and technology
decisions at time t are all independent of the quota holdings, αit−1 at time
t− 1.
The entry and exit decisions do not change any of the differential results
in the main body of this paper.
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Appendix III Uniform Price Clock Auction
The uniform price, clock auction is one of the easiest auctions to run and
to participate in. It is an iterative auction that proceeds in rounds. I will
describe how it would work for an IFQ quota marketplace.29
In the beginning the auctioneer lets everyone know the quantity of quota
available and an opening price. Then all bidders are given a period of time
to submit a bid.30 Their bid is simply a quantity: how much they would
like to buy at this price.31 Bidders do this without seeing each other’s bids.
At the end of the bidding period the auctioneer adds up the bids. If the
aggregate bid is larger than the quantity available, the price is raised by
one increment.32 This is the origin of the name ”clock auction”. The price
ticks up one increment per bidding period, in clock-work precision, until the
auction ends. The new price is posted and a new bidding period is opened.33
Bidders are asked to submit new bids.34 After re-submission, the auctioneer
again adds up the quantities. If the aggregate quantity is larger than the
amount available, the auction continues. If not, the auction stops.
At this point there is a final design choice. One could just accept the
result of the auction. That is, one could give each buyer who bid in the
last round the quantity they bid at the price for that round. However, it
29The auction I describe here is a particularly simple version of that proposed by [7].
Ours is simpler since we are only auctioning off a single homogeneous commodity, the
quota.
30The bid submission time period is a design choice. It is usually somewhere between 10
minutes and an hour. Short periods move the auction along at a fast rate. Slow periods
give bidders more time to contemplate and compute their bidding strategy.
31It is possible to allow sellers, other than the auctioneer, enter bids also. That would
simply be a negative quantity: how much they were willing to sell at the current price.
This is often referred to as a two-sided auction and is similar to a call market.
32The size of the increment is a design choice. High increments move the auction along
at a fast rate. Slow increments allow more gains to be captured.
33There is a design choice that can be made here as to whether the bidders should be
informed about what each of them bid. The answer is no for the individual bids if one
is worried about collusion. The answer is no for the aggregate if one wants to encourage
active participation by all in every round.
34There is still another design choice at this point. Should bidders be allowed to with-
draw their previous bid? If they did so they could then either forego bidding or bid
something totally different. Some argue that buyers should only be able to lower their
quantity demanded. This is called an activity rule. Some say it does not matter. Activity
rules move the auction along at a fast rate. But activity rules limit the options of bidders
and can cause inefficient outcomes.
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is possible that this does not fully exhaust the amount of quotas that are
available. The drop in the aggregate bids can be more than the excess in
the previous round. If these auctions are held often enough, this is not a
problem. The excess supply can simply be inventoried and made available at
the next auction. But if the auctions are infrequent and inventorying quota
can cause difficulties in the IFQ process, then the auction needs to continue
into another “phase.” In this second phase, past bids are ”re-submitted”
into the auction along with the bids from the last round and the collection
that maximizes the gains from trade are provisionally accepted.35 If that
collection displaces one of the bidders in the last period then the price is
increased by one increment and the auction continues as in the first phase.
If no one is displaced in the second phase, the auction stops.
The first phase is really easy for both auctioneer and bidder. The auction-
eer has a very simple calculation. Does the quantity bid exceed the amount
supplied? The incumbents have a simple calculation. They only need decide
at any price whether (a) they want more quota because they expect their
costs to be lower than that price or (b) they want to sell quota because they
expect their costs to be higher than that price. Potential entrants are on a
level playing field since they can see the price and decide whether they are
willing to pay that much in order to enter the fishery.
The second phase may seem complicated but bidders need not even know
that it happened. Bidders need only know that the price has increased and
bidding has resumed. Also, there is ample evidence from both laboratory
trials with this auction as well as commercial applications, that it is relatively
easy to learn how to bid.
With straight-forward bidding, the auction will exhaust all gains from
trade. That is, the buyers with the highest value for the items will win them.
The sellers with the lowest value for the items will sell them. The final price
will be the equilibrium price. This is a completely transparent process which
encourages liquidity.
35This is a simple optimization program which I will not present here.
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